The Guy With the Microphone is Always the Winner

The recent Chief of Army’s symposium introduced a new catchphrase: ‘command accountability’.

A bit of research brings up ADF Philosophical Doctrine COMMAND (Edition 1), which states:
“Accountability is the acceptance of the outcomes of action or inaction. Commanders are both recognised and accountable for what happens on their watch, regardless of their personal knowledge, contribution or fault. The performance of a military organisation is a reflection of the performance of the commander.”

Whereas it might have been somewhat ambiguous previously, this makes it absolutely clear … the commander is recognised (possibly with honours) if his command performs well, and is accountable, if it doesn’t. There is a big BUT here, however.

The only means by which the senior commander himself, e.g. the CA, can be held accountable, (should this become necessary) … is through the involvement of the public in highlighting failings. As evidenced by the Afghanistan war crimes investigations, this also applies if subordinate commanders are unaware of incidents and/or unwilling to expose their ‘team’ (and ultimately themselves).

This is unsurprising, as whistle-blowers have long been the touchstone for truth and honesty in military affairs.

In terms of 1st Armoured Regiment being stripped of its tanks and made a non-combatant, the CA is achieving what he (and the Department) wanted, i.e. a new unit which can ‘hit the ground running’ in a new role which doesn’t involve operating a regiment’s worth of armoured vehicles (thereby achieving crucial savings in the Defence budget).

It’s relevant here to point out that the need for a unit to manage new and emerging technologies is one that Defence has been aware of for years. Only when the issue became particularly urgent, however, was it forced to act.

One has to wonder how many members of 1 Armd Regt have been misled in this respect … convinced that they are the only ones capable of fulfilling this vital new role; one that Army desperately needs (supposedly)? What resources were devoted to convincing the unit’s leadership group that 1 Armd Regt had been specially selected; making them believe that a ‘new dawn for a glorious contribution to a magnificent new chapter in Army’s annals, was on the horizon’?

The fact that this ended the unit’s previous heritage and traditions built up over 75 years, and leaves Australia’s only armoured brigade missing almost 40% of its RAAC combat power, seems to be acceptable ‘collateral damage’. How can this be?

The united opposition of Armoured Corps leaders meant nothing. The experience foregone in the command of tank and cavalry units and associated promotion opportunities, is something from which the RAAC may never recover. The CA was determined to have his way and he did; despite the long-term damage to the RAAC (which seems to have held no significance at all).

The CA has declined to meet with anyone to ‘discuss’ 1 Armd Regt’s circumstances, while his chief of staff declines to answer any questions related to the matter.

The strategy is clear … continue ignoring anything negative that appears in the press (no matter how specific the articles, nor how frequently they occur), until those initiating them, simply ‘give up’.

Can the CA himself ever be held accountable? It would appear not (at least without an extensive whistle-blower campaign, paving the way).

Lieutenant Colonel Bruce Cameron, MC, RAAC (Ret’d)

 

FILE PHOTO (October 2024): An M1A1 Abrams main battle tank puts out a smokescreen at Cowley Beach, Queensland. Photo by Leading Seaman David Cox.

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