An Appalling Lapse of Judgement
“It was warm and humid as I stepped out of my vehicle to greet the commander of the Australian Army’s elite 3rd Brigade at the High Range training area near Townsville, last week. For months now, the Brigade has been training in high-end warfighting …”.
Maj Gen Mick Ryan, AM (Ret’d), 23 Sep 25.
The 3rd Brigade may be considered to be ‘elite’, but its combat power has been considerably weakened by the Chief of Army’s decision to strip 1st Armoured Regiment of its tanks. One of the consequences of this, is that Australia’s only ‘armoured’ brigade is left without a tank squadron, a cavalry squadron, and a third battlegroup headquarters; considerably reducing its combat power and flexibility. Another consequence is that the Brigade’s only armoured unit now has a dual role: reconnaissance and close fire support.
Even cursory consideration reveals that the two roles are incompatible. A single unit headquarters would never be able to effectively meet demands, possibly simultaneous, associated with Brigade reconnaissance and infantry fire support/quick attack needs — they are fundamentally ‘at odds’ with each other.
Of course, it is only on active service that these shortcomings would be exposed; until then, everything else can be ‘managed’ during training (though false lessons are being continuously inculcated throughout the Brigade).
2 Cav Regt’s dual role is obviously a peacetime training contingency; not something to be maintained in any operational context. BUT … how can the armour component of Australia’s only armoured brigade be provided by a unit established solely for peacetime training? Especially at a time when our strategic circumstances are described as ‘perilous’.
It is not just ‘not optimum’ in the words of the RAAC Representative Honorary Colonel, but actually a complete failure in terms of readiness. After all, is not the purpose of training … to maintain and enhance military readiness?
How can the Army possibly train in this way for ‘high-end war fighting’, involving both high intensity operations, as well as advanced technology? Surely, all units have to train as they would fight. To do otherwise is to invite disaster.
Interestingly, “the most common cases of military incompetence can be attributable to a flawed organisational culture”. There is absolutely no place for ad hoc organisations such as 2 Cav Regt, even if there is a strong imperative to save money in the Defence budget (to pay for the AUKUS subs).
A culture devoted to following orders without debate or challenge, is partly to blame here. How much better placed would the RAAC be if, for example, the leadership group were empowered (or took upon themselves the power) to canvas options in such matters?
It’s often said that “The difference between success and failure in war is the quality of leadership”. Sadly, neither the Chief of Army nor his Chief of Staff are prepared to meet with representatives of 1 Armd Regt veterans. No debate will be entertained.
Lieutenant Colonel Bruce Cameron, MC, RAAC (Ret’d)
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CAPTION: An Australian Army M1A2 Abrams main battle tank from the 2nd Cavalry Regiment during the South Queensland Warfighter Exercise at Shoalwater Bay, Queensland. Photo by Corporal Johnny Huang.
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