Avoiding the Issue and Taking the Easy Option: The RAAC Way?

Will the next Chief of Army (likely to be appointed at the end of 2025) revoke the decision to employ 1st Armoured Regiment as a Combat Experimentation Group (CXG), or will he maintain the status quo? Many RAAC senior officers have elected to take the easy option – stand on the sidelines and wait for the new CA to be appointed.

But surely this isn’t good enough. We used to be better than this.

Is this really the case, however, or is it only what we’d like to think. What happened during our last controversy is instructive.

In 2010, the then Chief of the Army (Lieutenant General Ken Gillespie) banned the wearing of berets, other than for ceremonial occasions. The reason given was increasing numbers of skin cancers being caused by sun exposure – yet Special Forces were given an exemption. Outrage was sparked within RAAC ranks, who saw the beret as a vital part of their Corps’ tradition and identity.

A Save the Black Beret Facebook page attracted almost 5000 followers; however, the RAAC leadership drew little attention to the essential importance of the beret as far as the Corps heritage was concerned. It became apparent that they were ‘keeping their powder dry’ and waiting for the next CA to be appointed. A proposal for a protest gathering in Canberra was quickly doused with cold water.

Lt Gen David Morrison became CA in June 2011 (and served for four years). Having received overwhelming feedback from troops on how unpopular the ban on berets was, he lifted it on 1 January 2014.

It would seem that RAAC senior officers had elected to stand on the sidelines and wait for the new CA to be appointed. They were prepared to ‘play the long game’ as far as berets were concerned, and it eventually paid off.

Is this the right thing to do, however, in terms of 1 Armd Regt’s role as the CXG? Should the considerable damage to the RAAC be accepted, in order to meet the Army’s urgent need for a unit to evaluate new technologies; or should RAAC tank-craft and skills developed over many years, be safeguarded (along with 3 Brigade’s armoured strength)?

It would appear that budgetary pressure forced Defence to do two things: (i) save money by stripping 1 Armd Regt of its tanks and reducing the combat power of the Army’s only armoured brigade (3 Brigade) by a tank squadron, a cavalry squadron and a battle-group headquarters; and (ii) create a new unit able to manage emerging technologies.

The CA appears to have accepted that this is as it must be, i.e. combat power and operational capability is secondary to financial targets.

The heritage and traditions built up by 1 Armd Regt over 75 years is considered ‘collateral damage’ in this bigger scheme of things. How weak spined we all are.

Lieutenant Colonel Bruce Cameron, MC, RAAC (Ret’d)

 

 

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