Is it possible to meet Defence priorities AND fund the AUKUS subs?

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One article published recently about anti-armour capability; the author making the point that armour retains its crucial role in terms of the land battle.

I offered the author the following comments:

“Good article Tavis. There are moves afoot within Defence, however, which make me wonder if this is indeed true: “Despite the rise of drones and precision fires, armour will remain a decisive part of the land battle in modern war”.

Tanks have been stripped from 1st Armoured Regiment and the unit has been made a non-combatant. Furthermore, the combat power of Army’s sole armoured brigade has been reduced by two armoured squadrons and a battlegroup headquarters. All this at a time when our strategic outlook is described as “most perilous”.

It seems that the Defence budget has to be pruned considerably if the ADF is to be able to afford the AUKUS subs. Investment in armour, e.g. active protection systems and advanced concealment options, is a thing of the past.

Like you, I would argue that now is the time for a clear anti-armour doctrine to be developed. Defence, however, seems to take the view that the ‘tank is dead’ (at least until the budgetary resources become available).”

There’s no doubt that the RAAC has been decimated to achieve savings to help pay for the AUKUS subs. The question is … what’s this mean for armour and anti-armour defence in terms of the littoral?

An essential element of the projection of land power in the littoral region, relates to seizing and controlling vital terrain and infrastructure. Only tanks have the capability to rapidly deploy and dominate the battlefield with their firepower.

If the Chief of Army had been serious when he stated that “the Australian Army’s future is fighting on the beaches, rivers, coastal waters and archipelagos of the Indo-Pacific”, 1 Armd Regt would never have been stripped of its tanks and 3 Brigade would still be a complete armoured brigade with tank, cavalry, and mechanised infantry battlegroups.

On the other hand, maybe the AUKUS subs are a much greater cost impost than generally understood. Either that, or our strategic circumstances are not as dire as we have been led to believe. The number of bleak assessments make this unlikely, however.

Which brings us back to funding costs associated with AUKUS, as the driver for urgent budgetary savings.

Is 1 Armd Regt destined never to be a tank regiment again? Or will the next CA reverse his predecessor’s decision? [The new CA is expected to be appointed at the end of 2026.]

Lieutenant Colonel Bruce Cameron, MC, RAAC (Ret’d)

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FILE PHOTO (2023): An Australian Army M1A1 Abrams tank from the 2nd Cavalry Regiment hits the shore during a combined amphibious assault activity on Exercise Alon in the Philippines. Story by Squadron Leader Courtney Jay. Photos by Lance Corporal Riley Blennerhassett.

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