Dismal end to the Army’s most senior unit
The following quote is from the Wikipedia entry for the Royal Australian Armoured Corps (RAAC):
“The removal of 1st Armoured Regiment as a combat unit, the RAAC’s oldest regular unit and one of its most decorated, effectively reduces the number of active combat Armour units in the Army to two; the 2nd Cavalry Regiment in Townsville and 2nd/14th Light Horse Regiment in Brisbane”.
This is the fewest number of regular Armour units in the Australian Army’s order of battle since 1966, when 1st Cavalry Regiment was raised to serve alongside 1st Armoured Regiment.”
[To avoid confusion with 1 Armd Regt, the title 1 Cav was changed to 2 Cav in 1970. The Third and Fourth Cavalry Regiments were raised in 1967 and 1971, respectively; until amalgamation in 1981. Unit identities were maintained … with B Squadron, 3/4 Cav Regt now providing support for the School of Armour.]
The role of the RAAC is: “To locate, identify, capture and destroy the enemy, by day or night, in combination with other arms, using fire and manoeuvre”. In order to do this, the RAAC now has available 2 Cav Regt with two squadrons of tanks and two squadrons of recon vehicles; and 2/14 LHR (QMI) with three squadrons of recon. [The re-equipment of both units with Boxer Combat Reconnaissance Vehicles (CVR) is scheduled to be completed by 2027.]
The shortcomings are obvious. Firstly, close fire support to infantry and recon roles are incompatible within a single unit.
Secondly, 3 Brigade (Townsville) was designated in the Defence Strategic Review (DSR) to be an armoured brigade. It should, therefore, comprise: a tank regiment; a cavalry regiment; and a mechanised infantry battalion. The present organisation of 2 Cav Regt means that the brigade is short a tank squadron, a cavalry squadron and a battlegroup headquarters.
The absence of the third battlegroup headquarters, in particular, creates a lack of flexibility. This exasperates command and control limitations. As a result, false lessons are inculcated throughout the brigade during training. While shortcomings of this sort might be deemed acceptable in peacetime, commitment to operations is a very different story.
Doubly surprising, is the fact that the nation’s strategic situation is presently described as ‘perilous’.
How often have Army units been forced to train on the basis of an organisation intended for peacetime training? The vital question can’t be ignored … how long would it take to move from one to the other, i.e. from a peacetime training role, to operational readiness? One can’t help wondering what the ADF’s current state of readiness is. What are the benchmarks for measuring it and how are these evaluated?
The RAAC was not the only Corps affected. Another consequence of the DSR decision making, resulted in the amalgamation of 5RAR and 7RAR. [7RAR, like 1 Armd Regt, was also located in Adelaide at the time; the linked battalion is now in Darwin.]
Following the announcement that 1 Armd Regt was to become a combat experimentation unit, the 2025 RAAC Corps Conference decided (as had the 2024 Conference) that:
“It remains your Corps’ experts’ view that the optimal way to train the tanks in Townsville is to provide a dedicated headquarters over them. It is also the optimal way to train 3 Bde’s cavalry. Probably of more import is that … 3 Bde only has two Battlegroup Headquarters. Raising another BGp HQ in 3 Bde should be given a greater priority to solve two problems.”
The present Chief of Army, however, has made it clear that he’s not going to accept the advice of the RAAC, no matter how logical or well-argued it might be. Saving money to meet the costs of the AUKUS subs is the driving factor that he has been forced to accept. This is the case, irrespective of the shortfall in combat power and decline in readiness levels.
How long has it been since a serving CA took a stand on behalf of the Army and said ‘No’ to a decision which would significantly weaken operational capability? Has the situation arisen before?
Of course, any such consideration is overshadowed by the fact that 1 Armd Regt’s 75 years’ service to the nation, as well as the unit’s esprit-de-corps, heritage and tradition are now all in abeyance until it is re-raised as a tank regiment once more. Hopefully, the Standard will be honoured by being laid up until re-presented at that time.
Lieutenant Colonel Bruce Cameron, MC, RAAC (Ret’d)
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FILE PHOTO (2023): Soldiers of the 1st Armoured Regiment honour their unit’s Standard in Adelaide. Photo by Private Sophie Hartley.
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Oh dear. Retired officers harking back to the past – a common trait. The capitalising on the knowledge and skills of the armoured corps to help the army to understand the application of emerging tech should be applauded. If recent conflicts have shown us anything failure to adapt early will lead to significant losses. How about celebrating the fact that instead of sustaining a number of hollow organisations a bold move was made to thicken units and gain early technology advantage.
Hat badges, guidons and battle honours are important but ensuring that an army is ready for the future is moreso.
Surely efforts of the veteran community would be better focussed supporting the efforts to ensure that Army is contemporary and prepared for the modern battlefield where technology currently has the edge over armoured formation manouvre.
Oh dear. Retired officers harking back to the past – sad really. The capitalising on the knowledge and skills of the armoured corps to help the army to understand the application of emerging tech. If recent conflicts have shown us anything failure to adapt early will lead to significant losses. How about celebrating the fact that instead of sustaining a number of hollow organisations a bold move was made to thicken units and gain early technology advantage.
Hat badges, guidons and battle honours are important but ensuring that an army is ready for the future is moreso.
Surely efforts of the veteran community would be better focussed supporting the efforts to ensure that Army is contemporary and prepared for the modern battlefield where technology currently has the edge over armoured formation manouvre.
Dear Contact Magazine,
Over 33,000 views for this single letter! Thank you for helping to make known so widely, the unethical and unreasonable manner in which the decision was made to strip tanks from 1st Armoured Regiment. There is a resonance here which shows just how much the Regiment continues to mean to its past members. When it happens, the Cambrai Day celebrations to honour the return of the unit to the ORBAT, will be massive and heartfelt by many. Thank you again.
Bruce
I’m from 5/7th battalion full mechanised basily infantry,s version of cavalry from 1979 to 1985 before they moved to Darwin, we worked with armoured division (puckupunyl) sorry if not spelt incorrectly and I personally found them to be highly professional soldiers, us grunts learnt a lot from them, would this be mr magoo (our so called leader) cost cutting just like all the other Labour mongrels before , if so wtf
I’m glad I read this never received Any communication regarding the issue. However I believe I know how the situation arose.
Truly appreciate everyone and The history of the corps.
Strange I hope to hear more regarding the subject matter.
Warmest regards
Kane A F S
Dismal end !!! Check out 1 FER !!! Now that was a dimal end !
A much more compelling case than similar previous articles published by CONTACT, however the title deflects from the point being made. I agree that 3 Brigade needs a restructure – a motorised battalion (1 RAR) has no place in an armoured brigade, however the penny pinchers in Canberra saw fit to reduce L400-3 to an anaemic level. Perhaps an a more optimal solution is for 1ARMD to pursue a Divisional Reconnaissance role equipped with Boxer (that could be force assigned to 3 BDE for Formation deployments), and for 2 Cav to raise a third tank Sqn by acquiring 2/14LHR’s tanks? I, too, am disappointed with Army continuing to sustain Brigades that do everything a little bit, rather than practising discrete functions with excellence. Agreed – 3 BDE simply lacks the horsepower to achieve its tasks especially when the GCE is detached, which is all too frequent; it is left with basically a single battle group plus a 2xCT Cav Screen and a Tank Sqn Reserve (or two impotent BGs), and whilst that BG is capable (and will become more so) it is not truly a Brigade.
Those of you who cannot counter the author’s opinion or other commenters opinions without resorting to personal insults will be removed or edited. That has always been the rule on this web site. Unlike most other web sites these days, this one is policed.
Brian Hartigan
CONTACT Editor
Well said Brian – and Bruce
I as an ex Tankie I find it insulting that the photo included with this article is an infantry unit with slouch hats not a regiment of beret clad soldiers. Long live the first armoured regiment, a specialised armoured outfit that had purpose and pride.
Check the photo again a little more closely. Slouch hats with emu plumes, yellow lanyards, definetly Armoured Corps Troopers.
Anonymous x 3 + ADGIE? What makes you think you 3 know how the armoured corps works especially when you won’t say your names?
Taiwan? If China retakes Taiwan it will be well and truly over by the time we get there.
,Also why would we help a country we don’t recognise at the UN against a country we do?
Dear Ex Sir,
The ADF has replaced 59 M1A2’s with 75 SepV3’s. So we have increased our MBT capability, notably at a time when our strategic focus is on SE Asia, where the application of this capability is limited. Customs and traditions; esprit de corps; are a means to ends, that ends being capability. Otherwise they are simply obstructionist ideas to pragmatic change. You’re welcome to your opinions, but
Considering the next hot war is likely to be Taiwan, I agree. Even this old Adgie can see this is creating a heavy expeditionary force. The good LtCol so still thinking WW3 will be sweeping battles through Eastern Europe again the Soviet Horde!